Evidence by University of the Pacific
McGeorge Law Review
Volume 27 | Issue 2 Article 19
1-1-1996
Evidence
University of the Pacific; McGeorge School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr
Part of the Legislation Commons
This Greensheet is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in McGeorge Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.
Recommended Citation
University of the Pacific; McGeorge School of Law, Evidence, 27 Pac. L. J. 761 (1996).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr/vol27/iss2/19
brought to you by COREView metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk
provided by Scholarly Commons
Evidence
Evidence; character traits-admissibility of prior sexual offenses
Evidence Code § 1108 (new); § 1101 (amended).
AB 882 (Rogan); 1995 STAT. Ch. 439
Existing law provides that evidence relating to a trait of a person's character
is inadmissible when offered to prove a person's conduct on a specific occasion.'
However, existing law provides several exceptions.2
Chapter 439 creates an additional exception? Under Chapter 439, when.
criminal relief is dependent upon whether the defendant committed a sexual
offense,4 evidence may be offered regarding the defendant's commission of
1. CAL EVID. CODE § 1101(a) (amended by Chapter 439); see id. (characterizing as inadmissible
evidence offered to prove a person's conduct in a specific situation if the evidence relates to the character of
a person, including opinions, information concerning his or her reputation, and specific previous acts). See
generally 1 B.E. WITIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, Exclusionary Rule and Exceptions § 325 (3d ed. 1986)
(discussing the reasons for the existence of an exclusionary rule).
2. CAL EvID. CODE § I 101(a) (amended by Chapter 439); see id. (granting as exceptions to the general
exclusionary rule California Evidence Code §§ I101(b), (c), 1102, 1103, 1108); id. § l101(b) (amended by
Chapter 439) (providing a non- exclusive list of facts for which evidence may be admitted, to include motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or unreasonable
belief regarding consent); id. § 1101 (c) (amended by Chapter 439) (granting an exception for evidence which
is proffered to support or attack the credibility of a witness); id. § 1102 (West 1966) (making admissible in a
criminal action, opinion regarding the defendant's character or reputation offered as evidence if offered by the
defendant to prove conformity with such trait or if offered by the prosecution to rebut evidence offered by the
defendant); id. § 1103 (West Supp. 1995) (allowing in a criminal action, opinion or evidence regarding the
victim's character, reputation, or specific behaviors if offered by the defendant to prove the conduct of the
victim or offered by the prosecution as a rebuttal to the defendant's admission); see also People v. Ewoldt, 7
Cal. 4th 380, 401, 867 P.2d 757, 769, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646, 658 (1994) (holding that evidence of prior
uncharged misconduct is relevant so long as both the uncharged misconduct and the charged offense are
sufficiently similar to support the assumption of a common design or plan). But see People v. Haslouer, 79 Cal.
App. 3d 818, 824-25, 145 Cal. Rptr. 234, 238 (1978) (noting that as a result of the numerous exceptions to
California Evidence Code § 1101, it would be more accurate to rewrite the rule in the affirmative as to what
is admissible).
3. CAL. EVtD. CODE § 1101(a) (amended by Chapter 439); see id. (adding California Evidence Code
§ 1108 to the list of exceptions under this section, so long as the evidence proffered is not inadmissible in
accordance with the provisions of California Evidence Code § 352); see also id. § 352 (West 1995) (granting
the court the discretion to exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial
value).
4. See id. § 1108(d)(1)(A) (enacted by Chapter 439) (defining "sexual offense" as a crime under the
law of any state or the United States that involves sexual battery as defined under California Penal Code §
243.4, rape as defined under California Penal Code § 261, unlawful sexual intercourse with persons under 18
years of age as defined in California Penal Code § 261.5, rape of a spouse as defined by California Penal Code
§ 262, rape or penetration of genital or anal openings by foreign objects as defined under California Penal Code
§ 264.1, unlawful sexual intercourse as defined in California Penal Code § 266c, sodomy as defined in
California Penal Code § 286, oral copulation as defined in California Penal Code § 288a, distribution of
harmful matter with the intent to seduce a minor as defined under California Penal Code § 288.2, continuous
sexual abuse of a child as defined by California Penal Code § 288.5, penetration by foreign objects as provided
in California Penal Code § 289, distribution across or within state lines of sexually explicit material involving
children as defined in California Penal Code § 311.2, sexual exploitation of a child as defined under California
Penal Code § 311.3, employment of a minor to create sexually explicit material defined by California Penal
Code § 311.4, advertising obscene material regarding sexual conduct to a person under 18 years of age as
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another sexual offense or offenses." Chapter 439 requires that if such evidence is
to be offered in court, disclosure of the evidence must be made to the defendant.
6
COMMENT
With the enactment of Chapter 439, the California Legislature declared that
the willingness to commit a sexual offense is not common to most individuals;
thus, evidence of any prior sexual offenses is particularly probative and necessary
for determining the credibility of the witness.!
The California Legislature, by enacting Chapter 439, adopted provisions
similar to the Federal Rules of Evidence which were adopted in 1994 as part of
the Federal Crime Bill.8
specified in California Penal Code § 311.10, possession or control of materials which reflect a minor child
engaging in sexual conduct as defined by California Penal Code § 311.11, lewd or obscene conduct as defined
by California Penal Code § 314, and molesting pupils and loitering about adult schools as defined by California
Penal Code § 647b); id. § 1108(d)(l)(B) (enacted by Chapter 439) (defining "sexual offense" to include contact
between the defendant's body, or an object within his or her control, and the genitals or anus of another person
without consent); id. § 1108(d)(1)(C) (enacted by Chapter 439) (defining "sexual offense" as including contact
between the defendant's genitals or anus and any part of another person's body without consent); Id. §
1108(d)(1)(D) (enacted by Chapter 439) (defining "sexual offense" as the derivation of sexual pleasure from
inflicting pain upon another person by causing death, bodily injury, or physical pain); id. § 1108(d)(1)(E)
(enacted by Chapter 439) (defining "sexual offense" to broadly include any attempt or conspiracy to engage
in any of the conduct mentioned above); see also id. § 1108(d)(2) (enacted by Chapter 439) (defining "consent"
as cooperation in an act while exercising free will); id. (adding that for a person to consent, the person must
possess knowledge of the nature of the act or transaction for which consent is required). But see id. (specifying
that consent may be ineffective because of a victim's age, existence of a mental disorder, or a developmental
or physical disability).
5. Id. § 1108(a) (enacted by Chapter 439); see id. (stating that in criminal cases where relief is
dependent upon the commission of a sexual offense by the defendant, evidence of prior sexual offcnses is not
excluded by California Evidence Cede § 1101 if it is admissible under California Evidence Code § 352); cf.
MICH. Com,. LAWS ANN. § 768.27 (West 1982) (allowing, in a criminal case, admission of evidence of a
defendant's prior actions which may tend to show motive, intent, or a scheme, plan or a system in doing an
act so long as the defendant's motive, intent, or a scheme, plan or system is material to the case).
6. Id. § 1108(b) (enacted by Chapter 439); see id. (requiring disclosure at least 30 days prior to the
scheduled trial date, or later if good cause exists); cf. FED. R. EviD. 413 (requiring disclosure to a defendant
in a sexual assault case within 15 days of trial-or sooner asjustice requires-when evidence of similar crimes
is to be offered by the prosecution); id. 414 (imposing the same requirement for a criminal child molestation
case); id. 415 (allowing the admission of evidence of similar acts in civil cases concerning sexual assault or
child molestation so long as disclosure is made to the defendant at least 15 days prior to trial, unless good cause
exists).
7. ASSEMBLYCOMMrrTEEONPUBLICSAFETY,COMMrrTEEANALYSISOFAB 882, at 2 (May 9, 1995);
see id. (recording the Legislature's belief that the propensity for committing sexual offenses is not common
within our society; thus, it is probative and should be admitted). But see SENATE COMMnrrEE ON CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, Comm=rrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 882 at 5 (Jun. 20, 1995) (quoting a study by the Bureau of Justice
Statistics which found that the recidivism for rape was the second lowest); Michael Marowitz, Prior Bad Acts:
Probative orPrejudicial?, RECORDER, Jan. 15, 1992, at 9 (challenging the supposition that all sexual offenders
are sociopaths and deviants with little hope of rehabilitation).
8. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322; see FED. R. EVID.
413; (specifying that in criminal cases where the defendant has been accused of sexual assault, evidence of the
defendant's prior commission of sexual assault offenses is admissible if relevant); id. 414 (stating that in
criminal cases where the defendant has been accused of child molestation, evidence of the defendant's prior
commission of child molestation offenses is admissible if relevant); id. 415 (making Federal Rules of Evidence
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Opponents argue that Chapter 439 is unnecessary given the California
Supreme Court's holding in People v. Ewoldt,9 in 1994.0 In Ewoldt, the
California Supreme Court held that evidence of a defendant's prior uncharged
misconduct is relevant, and thereby admissible, so long as both the uncharged
misconduct and the charged offense are sufficiently similar to suggest they are
both part of a common design or plan." In addition, critics posit that the
admission of evidence of past sexual offenses is highly prejudicial.' 2
However, proponents of Chapter 439 counter that in order to ensure a fair
trial, defendants are afforded protection relating to the admissibility of evidence.'
3
413 and 414 applicable to civil cases involving suits where the defendant is alleged to have committed offenses
including sexual assault and child molestation). See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, Some Comments about
Mr. David Karp's Remarks on Propensity Evidence, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 37 (discussing and criticizing the
Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415); David J. Karp, Evidence of Propensity and Probability in Sex
Offenses Cases and Other Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 15 (discussing the benefits of Federal Rules of
Evidence 413, 414, and 415); James S. Liebman, Violent Crime Control and Enforcement Act of 1994:
Proposed Evidence Rules 413 to 415-Some Problems and Recommendations, 20 U. DAYTON L. REv. 753
(1995) (discussing the provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414 and 415).
9. 7 Cal. 4th 380, 867 P.2d 757,27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646 (1994).
10. SENATE COMMrrTEE ON CRMINAL PROCEDURE, CoMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 882, at 8 (Jun. 20,
1995); see People v. Balcom, 7 Cal. 4th 414, 426, 867 P.2d 777, 785, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 666, 673 (1994)
(holding that in a criminal prosecution, evidence that a defendant committed an uncharged offense is
admissible so long as relevant to prove intent, identity, or the existence of a common design or plan); People
v. Mendoza, 37 Cal. App. 3d 717, 723, 112 Cal. Rptr. 565, 568 (1974) (holding that evidence of a different
sexual offense is admissible if it is offered to show a common scheme or plan, or if the offense is closely
related in time, similar to the crime charge, and committed with persons who are similar to the prosecuting
witness); see also Memorandum from Kathy Sher, California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, to the Members
of the Assembly Public Safety Committee (May 8, 1995) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal)
(acknowledging that where uncharged acts are similar to the charged act, such evidence of uncharged acts
would be admissible).
11. Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th at 401,867 P.2d at 769, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 678; see SENATE ComrrrEE ON
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, COMMrr'rE ANALYSIS of AB 882, at 6 (June 20, 1995). But see Miguel A. Mendez
& Edward J. Imwinkelried, People v. Ewoldt: The California Supreme Court's About-Face on the Plan Theory
for Admitting Evidence of an Accused's Uncharged Misconduct, 28 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 473 (1995) (arguing
that People v. Ewoldt was wrongly decided); cf. People v. Oliphant, 250 N.W.2d. 443, 446 (Mich. 1976)
(permitting the admission of evidence of a similar act so long as the following three criteria are present: (1) the
existence of sufficient similarities in the cases such that they indicate a plan or scheme, (2) the scheme or plan
in doing the act is material to a matter at issue, and (3) the substantial outweighing of any unfair prejudicial
effects by the probative value of the evidence).
12. SENATE FLOOR, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 882, at 4 (July 20, 1995); see id. (quoting the
American Civil Liberties Union, a verified member of the opposition to AB 882, as stating that "there is a
significant likelihood that the defendant will be found guilty, not for the crime... charged, but instead because
the jury concludes, [the defendant] should be punished for the other earlier conduct"); Memorandum from
Kathy Sher, supra note 10 (noting that where the facts and circumstances between the uncharged act and the
charged act are dissimilar, the introduction of evidence relating to uncharged acts would be prejudicial to the
defendant); Letter from Francisco Lobaco, Legislative Director, and Valerie Small Navarro, Legislative
Advocate, America Civil Liberties Union, to Members of the Senate Criminal Procedure Committee, (June 14,
1995) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (urging members of the Senate Criminal Procedure
Comnuttee to oppose AB 882 because of its highly prejudicial effect); cf. Freeman v. State, 486 P.2d 967, 978
(Alaska 1971) (noting that evidence of prior sexual misconduct is especially apt to arouse "hostile sentiments"
in the jury).
13. ASSEMBLY COMMImTE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, CoMMnFrEE ANALYSIS OFAB 882, at 2 (May 9, 1995);
see id. (stating that the California Evidence Code affords defendants appropriate protection); id. (providing a
non-exclusive listing of protections available to ensure a fair trial to include rules against hearsay and the
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For example, evidence of prior sexual offenses proffered under Chapter 439 is not
automatically admissible and must comply with the existing protection afforded
to the defendant.14 Further, evidence of prior sexual offenses must be relevant.1
5
Also, a court has the discretion to prevent the admittance of evidence of a prior
sexual offense where its prejudicial value substantially outweighs its probative
value.16 Finally, Chapter 439's disclosure requirements provide a dfendant with




Evidence Code § 755 (new).
SB 982 (Sois); 1995 STAT. Ch. 888
Under existing law, any witness' who is incapable of speaking or
understanding English will be provided with an interpreter.2 Existing law also
court's discretion not to admit evidence where the prejudicial value outweighs the probative value); see also
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; (granting the right to a fair trial to a defendant in a criminal case). But see Marowitz,
supra note 7, at 9 (reporting that studies by the National Jury Project have found that the mere fact that the state
has brought charges against an individual weighs against the defendant's presumption of innocence in the
minds of jurors). See generally Timothy E. Travers, Annotation, Admissibility, in Rape Case, of Evidence That
Accused Raped or Attempted to Rape Person Other Than Prosecutrix, 2 A.L.R. 4TH 330 (1980 & Supp. 1995)
(discussing the admissibility of evidence that the accused raped or attempted to rape a person other than the
person for whom he was charged with raping).
14. ASSE MLYFLOOR, COMMrrEEANALYSIS oFAB 882, at 2 (May 15, 1995); see id. (acknowledging
that appropriate protection for the admissibility of evidence continues to exist).
15. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 210 (West 1995) (defining "relevant evidence" as evidence which (1) is
relevant to either the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant and (2) has a tendency in reason to prove or
disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action); see also People v.
Brandon, 32 Cal. App. 4th 1033, 1050, 38 Cal. Rptr.2d 751, 759 (1995) (recognizing that the trial court
possesses wide discretion in determining the relevancy of evidence).
16. CAL. EviD. CODE § 352 (West 1995); see id. (granting the court the discretion to exclude evidence
if the prejudicial effect of admitting the evidence substantially outweighs the probative effect of its admis3ion);
see also Adldns v. Brett, 184 Cal. 252, 258, 193 P. 251,254 (1920) (finding that the determination of whether
to exclude prejudicial evidence is largely one of discretion for the trial judge).
17. ASSEMBLYCOMMrTTEEONPUBLICSAFETY,COMMITrEEANALYSISOFAB 882, at2 (May 9, 1995);
see id. (stating that the disclosure requirements will protect the defendant from unfair surprise and provide
adequate time for preparation of a defense).
I. See CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 1878 (west 1983) (defining "witness" to mean anyone who gives a
sworn declaration as evidence); CAL. PENAL CODE § 679.01(c) (West 1988) (defining "witness" as anyone
expected to testify for the prosecution).
2. CAL. EVID. CODE § 752(a) (West 1995); see id. § 750 (West 1995) (providing that interpreters will
be bound by the rules governing witnesses); id. § 751(a) (west 1995) (requiring the interpreter to take an oath
that he or she will make an accurate interpretation to the witness and will accurately interpret the witness'
answers); id. § 752(b) (West 1995) (mandating that the record identify the appointed interpreter); see also id.
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provides that a defendant in a criminal trial who does not understand English has
the right to an interpreter during the entire proceedings.3 Under existing law, an
interpreter for a criminal case may be paid from the county treasury; whereas, the
litigants must pay the interpreter's fees for civil litigation.4
§ 753(a) (West 1995) (requiring a translator to be appointed where a writing is introduced that contains
characters which may not be readily understood); id. § 755.5(a) (West 1995) (requiring the court to appoint
an interpreter for any person, who does not understand English and who is ordered to undergo a medical
examination); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 68561(a) (West Supp. 1995) (mandating that any court interpreter must be
certified for the language used); id. § 68561(c) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that a court may appoint a non-
certified court interpreter where there is good cause); id. § 68566 (West Supp. 1995) (specifying that only those
persons who hold valid certificates as a certified court interpreter, or who are named on a list of recommended
court interpreters created by the State Personnel Board, will be designated "certified court interpreter");
Gardiana v. Small Claims Court, 59 Cal. App. 3d 412, 418-19, 130 Cal. Rptr. 675, 678 (1976) (concluding that
it would be an abuse of the court's discretion to fail to appoint an interpreter where there is uncontradicted
evidence that a witness does not understand English); Hsu v. Mount Zion Hosp., 259 Cal. App. 2d 562, 582,
66 Cal. Rptr. 659, 671 (1968) (holding that the trial court may exercise its discretion in appointing an
interpreter); cf. D.C. CODE ANN. § 31-2702(a) (1993) (permitting the court to appoint an interpreter for any
party or witness in any civil or criminal proceeding); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-10-3(A) (Michie 1987) (requiring
the court to appoint an interpreter where a witness or a principal party to the litigation requests one). See
generally Maria E. Camposeco, State Courts Increasingly Facing Language Barrier, SACRAMiENTO BEE, Dec.
17, 1992, at Al (stating that throughout California there were 1400 certified Spanish court interpreters as of
December, 1991, but only 120 interpreters certified in other languages); Gary Gorman, Court Interpreters
Speak Language of Law, L.A. TiES, Apr. 5, 1993, at B1 (estimating that Ventura County spends about
$500,000 annually employing court interpreters); Ruth Hammond, Lost in Translation; For Immigrants in
Court, Bad Interpreters Rig the Jury, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 1993, at C3 (observing that 31% of federal cases
in 1992 requiring an interpreter employed non-certified interpreters).
3. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14; see CAL GOv'T CODE § 26806(a) (West 1988) (permitting the county clerk
of any county with a population exceeding 900,000, to employ as many interpreters as necessary to assist with
criminal cases and juvenile court); id. § 26806(b) (West 1988) (requiring the county clerk to assign interpreters
to those courts where they are needed); id. § 26806(c) (West 1988) (allowing the county clerk to assign
interpreters to civil proceedings when they are not needed for criminal or juvenile cases); see also People v.
Rodriguez, 42 Cal. 3d 1005, 1012, 728 P.2d 202, 206,232 Cal. Rptr. 132, 136 (1986) (ruling that a failure to
provide a defendant with an interpreter is not a reversible error if the appellate court can declare that the
mistake was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); People v. Chavez, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1471, 1476, 283 Cal.
Rptr. 71, 74 (1991) (determining that a defendant is entitled to an interpreter for all stages of the criminal
proceedings including the jury instructions); In re Raymondo B., 203 Cal. App. 3d 1447, 1453, 250 Cal. Rptr.
812, 815 (1988) (finding that a defendant's request for an interpreter does not necessarily mean the defendant
is entitled to one; but rather, the right to an interpreter is based upon whether the defendant can understand
English or not); People v. Baez, 195 Cal. App. 3d 1431, 1433, 241 Cal. Rptr. 435, 436 (1987) (holding that
"borrowing" a defendant's interpreter to assist with the examination of prosecution witnesses violated the
defendant's constitutional right to an exclusive interpreter); People v. Rioz, 161 Cal. App. 3d 905, 912, 207
Cal. Rptr. 903, 907 (1984) (concluding that the four defendants' constitutional right to an interpreter was
violated where only one interpreter was provided for the four); People v. Mora, 153 Cal. App. 3d 18, 22, 199
Cal. Rptr. 904, 906 (1984) (holding that any impropriety that resulted in an interpreter's failure to take a sworn
oath was waived by the defendant's failure to object in a timely manner). See generally Beth G.Lindie,
Comment, Inadequate Interpreting Services in Courts and the Rules of Admissibility of Testimony on
Extrajudicial Interpretations, 48 U. MAMI L. REv. 399, 403-08 (1993) (discussing the development of a
defendant's right to a court appointed interpreter); Michael B. Shulman, Note, No Hablo Ingkds: Court
Interpretation as a Major Obstacle to Fairness for Non-English Speaking Defendants, 46 VAND. L. REv. 175,
176 (1993) (relating an incident where a man was convicted on drug charges due to a mistake made by the
court interpreter).
4. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 68092(a), (b) (West 1976); see id. § 68092(b) (West 1976) (providing that
where the county is a party in civil litigation, an interpreter is entitled to receive the same fee as the interpreter
would receive in a criminal proceeding).
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Chapter 888 provides that in proceedings concerning domestic violence,5 any
party who does not speak or understand English may be appointed an interpreter
to assist with communication between the party and the party's counsel.6 Chapter
888 requires that the interpreter be present in the courtroom before the
proceedings may commence. Chapter 888 specifies that the parties will pay the
fees for the interpreter except where a party appears in forma pauperis.8
In addition, Chapter 888 requires the Judicial Council9 to revise and modify
all relevant forms and rules, as well as apply for any available funding "necessary
5. See CAL FAM. CODE §§ 6200-6389 (West 1994 & Supp. 1995) (setting forth the provisions of the
Domestic Violence Prevention Act); id. § 6211(a)-(f) (West 1994) (defining domestic violence to mean any
abuse committed against a current or former spouse or cohabitant, a party's child, or any person related by
consanguinity or affinity); id. § 6250 (West 1994) (providing that a court may issue an ex parte emergency
protective order where a law enforcement agent asserts reasonable grounds that a person is in immediate and
present danger of domestic violence, or a child is in immediate and present danger of being abused by a
household member); id. § 6253 (West 1994) (setting forth the contents of an emergency protective order); Id.
§ 6254 (West 1994) (stating the availability of a protective order is not affected by the endangered person
leaving the household); id. § 6256 (West 1994) (specifying that a protective order will expire at the close of
the fifth court day or the seventh calendar day); id. § 6271 (West 1994) (setting forth the duties of the law
enforcement officer requesting an emergency protective order); id. § 6272(a) (West 1994) (providing that a
law enforcement officer must employ every reasonable means possible to enforce a protective order); id. §
6360 (West 1994) (permitting protective orders to be included in judgments for dissolution or nullity of
marriage, or for a legal separation of the parties).
6. CAL. EvID. CODE § 755(a) (enacted by Chapter 888); see id. (providing that this section applies to
actions brought under California Family Code §§ 6200-6389 and §§ 7600-7730); see also id. § 755(d) (enacted
by Chapter 888) (providing that Chapter 888 does not prohibit the presence of any other person to assist a
party).
7. Id. § 755(c) (enacted by Chapter 888). But see id. § 755(c)(1)-(3) (enacted by Chapter 888)
(providing that the court may extend, although an interpreter is not present, the duration of a previously-issued
temporary order, issue an order when the necessity for the order outweighs the necessity for the interpreter, or
where a party which has received notice that the court will not provide an interpreter has failed to provide its
own).
8. Id. § 755(b) (enacted by Chapter 888); see CAL. GOV'T CODE § 68511.3(a) (West Supp. 1995)
(authorizing the Judicial Council to formulate rules for litigants wishing to proceed in forma pauperis); id. §
68511.3(c) (West Supp. 1995) (permitting a court to order a litigant whose financial status has improved, to
repay all fees waived within three years of having allowed that litigant to proceed in forma pauperis); BLAcK's
LAW DICTIONARY 779 (6th ed. 1990) (describing in forma pauperis as permission given by the court to a poor
person to proceed in a legal action without having to pay court fees); see also Haglund v. Superior Court, 139
Cal. App. 3d 256, 259, 188 Cal. Rptr. 627, 628 (1982) (ruling that a lower court erred in denying the petition
of a recipient of AFDC and food stamps to proceed in forma pauperis); cf. OR. REV. STAT. § 45.275(1) (1993)
(requiring the court to appoint an interpreter for any indigent person involved in a criminal or civil proceeding
when necessary).
9. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (specifying the composition of the Judicial Council as well as its
powers and duties); see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 6226 (West 1994) (providing that the Judicial Council must
create forms for applying for protective orders); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 68562(e) (West Supp. 1995) (requiring
the Judicial Council to establish programs for recruiting, training, and evaluating court interpreters); id. §
68564 (West Supp. 1995) (providing that the Judicial Council must establish standards and procedures
governing court interpreters).
10. See SENATE COMMrnEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 982, at 2 (May 15,
1995) (noting that about three million dollars in federal funds have been allocated to California for programs
concerning the prevention of domestic violence).
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to implement its provisions."
COMMENT
Chapter 888 was implemented in response to the large number of family law
actions being brought by non-English speaking parties appearing without the aid
of counsel. 2 The burden of completing the required paperwork and the
procedures required to obtain necessary court orders is enhanced for these parties
who lack proficiency in the English language.13 Chapter 888 is intended to reduce
the problems that arise in such situations since a number of these actions involve
requests for protective or restraining orders which may be the only protection
available for some of these parties. 4
A. James Kachmar
11. CAL. EViD. CODE §§ 755(b), 755(e), 755(f) (enacted by Chapter 888); see id. § 755(b) (enacted by
Chapter 888) (requiring the Judicial Council to amend California Rule of Court 985(i) by July 1, 1996); id. §
755(e) (enacted by Chapter 888) (stating that funding for the implementation of Chapter 888 can only be
acquired from agencies receiving funds from the federal Violence Against Women Act or from sources other
than the state); id. (providing that the Judicial Council as well as local entities, must comply with Chapter 888
only to the extent that funding is made available for its implementation); id. § 755(f) (enacted by Chapter 888)
(providing that the Judicial Council must also modify the forms necessary for petitioning for a temporary
restraining order); see also CAL. R. Cr. § 985(i)(l)-(9) (West 1995) (setting forth various fees that may be
waived where a party appears in forma pauperis).
12. SENATE FLOOR, COMMrrE ANALYSIS OF SB 982, at 3 (Apr. 24, 1995).
13. Id.
14. SENATEJUDICIARYCOMMITEECOMMI'TEEANALYSISoFSB 982, at 3 (Apr. 18,1995); see SENATE
COMMrrrEE ON APPROPRATIONS, COMMmTEE ANALYSTS OF SB 982, at 1 (May 15, 1995) (estimating that there
are about 45,000 domestic violence restraining orders issued in Los Angeles County each year); SENATE
FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 982, at 3 (Apr. 24, 1995) (observing that judges have difficulties in
determining whether to issue a protective order since they might not be able to decipher a petition filed by a
party who is not proficient in the English language); id. (explaining that where non-English speaking parties
appear in court without an interpreter or counsel, the judge may have to perform the roles of judge, attorney,
and interpreter); SENATE JUDICIARY COMMrrrEE, COMMIrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 982, at 3 (Apr. 18, 1995)
(noting that restraining orders may protect a party from harassment, intimidation, or serious physical harm);
see also Letter from Judith R. Klein-Pritchard, Client Advocate, Woman Haven, Inc., to California Senator
Calderon (Mar. 21, 1995) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (proposing that a battered woman who
does not speak English will be better able to understand her rights to judicial protection where a court
interpreter is appointed to assist her); Letter from Beverly J. Owen, Director of the Domestic Violence
Program, Solano Women's Crisis Center, to California Senator Calderon (Mar. 20, 1995) (copy on file with
the Pacific Law Journal) (recounting how some battered women could not have their cases heard until they




Evidence Code §§ 1253, 1360 (new); § 767 (amended).
AB 355 (Rogan); 1995 STAT. Ch. 87
Under existing law, a leading question may not ordinarily be asked of a
witness on direct or redirect examination. However, a leading question may
generally be asked of a witness on cross-examination or recross-examination.2
Existing law allows the court, in the interests of justice, to only permit
leading questions to be asked of a child under ten years of age in specified cases.
3
Chapter 87 expands the situations where a court may permit leading questions to
be asked by adding the offense of continuous sexual abuse.4
Under existing law, evidence5 of a statement 6 is inadmissible if the statement
1. CAL. EVID. CODE § 767(a)(1) (amended by Chapter 87); see id. (emphasizing that a leading question
may be asked of a witness on direct or redirect if special circumstances exist where the interests of justice
require such leading questions).
2. Id. § 767(a)(2) (amended by Chapter 87).
3. Id. § 767(b) (amended by Chapter 87); see id. (specifying that the court may in the interests of
justice permit leading questions to be asked of a child under 10 years of age in a case involving a prosecution
under Penal Code §§ 273a, 273d, 288, and 288.5). But see Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 827 (1990) (holding
that a child's statements did not carry the requisite guarantees of trustworthiness to overcome the Confrontation
Clause requirement); id. at 820 (stating that a child's out-of-court statements must indicate a particularized
guarantee of trustworthiness that can be drawn from the totality of the circumstances in order to be admitted
under the Confrontation Clause); id. at 821 (highlighting the factors that have been developed by federal courts
to determine whether hearsay statements made by child witnesses in sexual abuse cases are reliable, such as
the spontaneity and consistent repetition of the statement, the mental state of the declarant, the use of
terminology unexpected of a child of similar age, and the lack of motive to fabricate on the part of the child
witness). See generally CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a(a) (West Supp. 1995) (stating that it is a crime to willfully
harm or injure a child, or to engage in conduct that endangers a child or threatens the child's health); id. §
273d(a) (West Supp. 1995) (asserting that it is a crime for any person to willfully inflict upon a child any cruel
or inhuman corporal punishment or injury resulting in a traumatic condition); id. § 288(a) (West Supp. 1995)
(establishing that any person who commits any lewd or lascivious act upon or with the body of a child who
is under the age of 14 years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual
desires of that person or the child, is guilty of a felony).
4. CAL EviD. CODE § 767(b)(2) (amended by Chapter 87); see id. (specifying that in certain
circumstances the court may permit a leading question to be asked of a child under 10 years of age in a case
involving a prosecution under Penal Code § 288.5); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 288.5(a) (West Supp. 1995)
(indicating that any person, who either resides in the same home with the minor child or has recurring access
to the child, who over a period of time, not less than three months in duration, engages in three or more acts
of substantial sexual conduct with a child under the age of 14 years at the time of the commission of the offense
or three or more acts of lewd or lascivious conduct, is guilty of continuous sexual abuse of a child). See
generally 3 B.E. WTaN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, Introduction of Evidence at Trial § 1822(c) (3rd ed. 1986)
(discussing the authority a judge has, in the interest ofjustice, to permit leading questions to children under
the age of 10 in prosecutions involving the specified offenses against children).
5. See CAL EvID. CODE § 140 (West 1995) (defining "evidence" as testimony, writings, material
objects, or other things presented to the senses that are offered to prove the existence or nonexistence of a fact).
6. See id. § 225 (West 1995) (specifying that "statement" means an oral or written verbal expression,
or nonverbal conduct of a person intended by him or her as a substitute for oral or written verbal expression);
see also id. § 125 (West 1995) (indicating that "conduct" includes all active and passive behavior, both verbal
and nonverbal).
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was made under circumstances which indicate its lack of trustworthiness!
Moreover, "hearsay evidence" is evidence of a statement that was made other
than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the
truth of the matter stated, and is inadmissible except as provided by law.8 Chapter
87 provides that evidence of a statement, made by a victim who is a minor at the
time of the proceedings and under the age of twelve at the time that the statement
was made, describing acts or attempted acts of child abuse? or neglect, 0 is not
made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement was made for specified
purposes."
7. Id. § 1252 (West 1995).
8. Id. § 1200(a), (b) (West 1995); see FED. R. EvID. 80 1(c) (setting forth the definition of "hearsay
evidence" as an out of court statement made by a declarant, other than a witness testifying at trial, that is
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted); GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 6.1 (2nd ed. 1987) (discussing the risks inherent with hearsay as the following: (1) the sincerity
of the declarant when he or she made their statement; (2) a possible mistransmission in communicating the
statement to another, (3) a perception problem with the declarant's observations; and (4) inaccuracy in the
declarant's memory of the situation); see also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 8.2 (1995) (analyzing
the hearsay risks inherent in out-of-court statements offered to prove the matter asserted via a two-step
inference test, whereby the first inference involves taking the statements as proof of the thought or mental state
of the speaker, which is affected by the risk of insincerity and the risk of narrative ambiguity, and the second
inference involves taking the belief as evidence of the event or condition which is affected by the risks of
misperception and failed memory).
9. See id. § 1253 (enacted by Chapter 87) (indicating that California Penal Code §§ 281-294 define
"child abuse" for purposes of Evidence Code § 1253); id. § 1360(c) (enacted by Chapter 87) (defining "child
abuse" as any act proscribed by Penal Code §§ 273a, 273d, or 288.5, or any of the acts described in Penal Code
§ 11165.1); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.1 (West 1992) (referring to all the acts that constitute sexual abuse,
which is the equivalent of sexual assault or sexual exploitation).
10. See CAL EVID. CODE § 1253 (enacted by Chapter 87) (stating that for purposes of this section,
"child neglect" has the meanings provided in Evidence Code § 1360(c)); id. § 1360(c) (enacted by Chapter 87)
(defining "child neglect" as any of the acts described in Penal.Code § 11165.2); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.2
(West 1992) (enumerating the acts that indicate child neglect, severe neglect, and general neglect).
11. CAL. EviD. CODE § 1253 (enacted by Chapter 87); see id. (establishing that, subject to Evidence
Code § 1252, evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement was made
for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and it describes medical history, or past or present symptoms,
pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as
reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment); see also id. § 1252 (West 1995) (maintaining that evidence of
a statement is inadmissible if the statement was made under circumstances such as to indicate its lack of
trustworthiness); cf. ARK. CODE ANN.§ 804(b)(6) (Michie 1995) (setting forth an exception to the hearsay rule
for a statement made by a child concerning any type of sexual offense, or attempted sexual offense with, on,
or against the child); IDAHO CODE § 803(4) (1995) (creating exceptions to the hearsay rule if the statement is
made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present
symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the source of the pain insofar as it is reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or
treatment); MD. CODE ANN., CIS. & JUD. PRoc. § 9-103.1(b)(1), (2) (1995) (authorizing the admissibility of
a statement to prove the truth of the matter asserted, made by a child under the age of 12 years in specified
child abuse cases, or any sexual abuse cases provided that the statement was made to and is offered by a
licensed physician, a licensed psychologist, a licensed social worker, or a teacher); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.460
18(a), (b) (1993) (establishing that if the case involves sexual conduct with a minor, a statement by a child is
not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule and that in criminal trials there must be corroborative evidence of
the act of sexual conduct and of the alleged defendant's opportunity to participate in the act); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (West 1995) (indicating that a statement made by a child under the age of 10,
describing any act of sexual conduct, or attempted act of sexual conduct, is admissible evidence if the court
finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, that the time, content, and circumstances of the
statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability, and the child either testifies at the proceedings, or provided
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Chapter 87 further provides an exception to the hearsay rule, in a criminal
prosecution where the victim is a minor, for the admission of statements made by
the victim when the victim is under the age of twelve, describing any acts or
attempted acts of child abuse or neglect, with or on the child by another, if
specific factors apply. 2
In addition, a statement will not be made inadmissible if the child testifies at
the proceedings.1 3 Lastly, a child's statement will be admissible if he or she is




Every year children are sexually abused at an alarming rate.' 7 The task of the
prosecution to criminalize the assailants is often very difficult because of
that there is corroborative evidence of the act, is unavailable as a witness).
12. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1360(a) (enacted by Chapter 87); see id. (stating that a statement made by the
victim describing any act of child abuse or neglect performed with or on the child by another, or describing
any attempted act of child abuse or neglect with or on the child by another, is not made inadmissible by the
hearsay rule if all of the following apply: (1) The statement is not othervise admissible by statute or court rule;
(2) the court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, that the time, content, and
circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability; (3) the child either testifies at the
proceedings, or is unavailable as a witness, in which case the statement may be admitted only if there is
evidence of the child abuse or neglect that corroborates the statement made by the child); see also Id. § 1360(b)
(enacted by Chapter 87) (providing that a statement may not be admitted unless the proponent of the statement
makes known to the adverse party the intention to offer the statement and the particulars of the statement
sufficiently in advance of the proceedings in order to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to
prepare to meet the statement); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 821 (1990) (holding that indicia of reliability
can be inferred where the evidence falls within an established hearsay exception, but in other cases it must be
shown); id. at 822 (noting that the courts have considerable leeway in their consideration of appropriate
factors). See generally 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 87, sec. 3, at 217 (adding "Article 16, Statements by Children
Under the Age of 12 in Child Neglect and Abuse Proceedings," to chapter 2 of Division 10 of the California
Evidence Code).
13. CAL. Evan. CODE § 1360(a)(3)(A) (enacted by Chapter 87).
14. See id. § 1350 (West 1995) (specifying what "unavailable as a witness" means as applied to the
hearsay rule).
15. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 344 (6th ed. 1990) (specifying that "corroborate" means to
strengthen; to add weight or credibility to a thing by additional and confirming facts or evidence).
16. CAL. EviD. CODE § 1360(a)(3)(B) (enacted by Chapter 87).
17. See Jean L. Kelly, Legislative Responses to Child Sexual Abuse Cases: The Hearsay Exception and
the Videotape Deposition, 34 CATH. U. L. REv. 1021, 1021 n.1 (1985) (citing a statistic from the American
Humane Association which states that there was an 852% increase in reported child sexual abuse case!; from
1976 to 1983); John E.B. Myers, The Child SexualAbuse Literature: A Callfor Greater Objectivity, 88 MICH.
L. REV. 1709, 1709 (1990) (reporting that the American Humane Association estimates that in 1986 there were
132,000 substantiated cases of child sexual abuse in the United States); Marianne Szegedy-Maszak, Who's to
Judge?, N.Y. TWmss, May 21, 1989, at 28 (noting that in 1976 there were 6000 confirmed reports of child
sexual abuse and in 1984 the figure was 100,000); id. (stating that the increase in reported child sexual abuse
cases is happening as a result of the heightened public awareness and sensitivity to child sexual abuse
situations).
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evidentiary problems, specifically a lack of eyewitnesses. 8 As a result, Chapter
87 creates exceptions to the hearsay rule for statements made by child victims,
when the statements are describing acts of child abuse or child neglect.' 9
In addition, Chapter 87 was enacted to conform the California Evidence Code
with the Federal Rules of Evidence and the evidence rules of the majority of the
states.
In other states there is an exception to the hearsay rule in civil cases for a
statement made by a child regarding any type of sexual offense on or against the
child.2 ' Such statutes provide that the admissibility of the statements is based on
a reasonable guarantee of trustworthiness, and the trial court may rely on
specified factors in deciding whether the statement is sufficiently trustworthy.2
Those who oppose the enactment of Chapter 87 believe it will infringe on the
right of the defendant to confront his or her accusers. 23 In addition, exceptions to
18. See Kelly, supra note 17, at 1024 (asserting that most sexual assaults take place in the privacy of
the home, and therefore there are few, if any, witnesses); id. at 1025 (specifying some of the evidentiary
problems that the prosecution must deal with in child sexual abuse cases, such as a delay in the reporting of
the abuse, the absence of eyewitnesses, a lack of physical evidence, and the potential lack of credibility of the
child victim because of limited cognitive and verbal skills). See generally Daniel J. Capra, Child-Witness
Statements and the Right to Confrontation, N.Y.LJ., July 13, 1990, at 3 (stating that in order to protect
children who are victims of sex abuse from the trauma of in-court testimony, and to advance the state interest
of prosecuting the difficult-to-prove offense of child sex abuse, more than 40 states have adopted rules or
statutes allowing statements of children to be used in lieu of traditional in-court testimony).
19. CAL. EViD. CooE § 1253 (enacted by Chapter 87); id. 1360(a) (enacted by Chapter 87).
20. ASSEMBLY FLOOR. COMMrrEE ANALYSIS OFAB 355, at 2 (May 4, 1995). Compare FED. R. EVID.
803(4) (creating an exception to the hearsay rule if the statement is made for purposes of medical diagnosis
or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception
or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or
treatment) with CAL. EviD. CODE § 1250 (West 1995) (indicating that subject to California Evidence Code §
1252, evidence of a statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation
(including a statement of intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, or bodily health) is not made
inadmissible by the hearsay rule when the evidence is offered to prove the declarant's state of mind, emotion,
or physical sensation at that time or any other time when it is itself an issue in the action, or when the evidence
is offered to prove or explain acts or conduct of the declarant) and id. § 1252 (West 1995) (providing that the
evidence of a statement is inadmissible under this article if the statement was made under circumstances such
as to indicate its lack of trustworthiness).
21. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 804(b)(6) (Michie 1994) (setting forth an exception to the hearsay rule
in civil cases for a statement made by a child concerning any type of sexual offense, or attempted sexual
offense, with, on, or against the child); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.460 18(a), (b) (1993) (establishing that if the case
involves sexual conduct with a minor, a statement by a child is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule).
22. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 804(b)(6)(A)(1)-(14) (Michie 1994) (enumerating the factors in deciding
trustworthiness as the following: (1) the spontaneity of the statement; (2) the lack of time to fabricate; (3) the
consistency and repetition of the statement and whether the child has recanted the statement; (4) the mental
state of the child; (5) the competency of the child to testify; (6) the child's use of terminology unexpected of
a child of a similar age; (7) the lack of a motive by the child to fabricate the statement; (8) the lack of bias by
the child; (9) whether it is an embarrassing event the child would not normally relate; (10) the credibility of
the person testifying to the statement; (11) suggestiveness created by leading questions; (12) whether an adult
with custody or control of the child may bear a grudge against the accused offender, and may attempt to coach
the child into making false charges; (13) corroboration of the statement by other evidence; and (14)
corroboration of the alleged offense by other evidence).
23. SENATE FLOOi, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS oFAB 355, at 2 (June 22, 1995); see id. (indicating that the
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice and the American Civil Liberties Union oppose the hearsay
exceptions of AB 355 because these sections will infringe on the right of a defendant to face-to-face
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the hearsay rule may present risks in accurately ascertaining the validity of the
declarant's statement because of the inability to cross-examine the witness.24
Alternatively, a court may determine that the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the child declarant's statement indicate its trustworthiness so that the
need for cross examination of the child declarant is eliminated.
Moreover, if the defendant is afforded the right to confront the victim, then
the victim will likely suffer further harm from the face-to-face confrontation with
the accused.26
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court has struggled with the competing
interests of the safety and well-being of the victims and the constitutional rights
of the accused.27 In Maryland v. Craigs the Supreme Court concluded that the
preference for face-to-face confrontation must sometimes give way to consider-
ations of public policy.
29
confrontation of his or her accusers); Jacqueline Miller Beckett, The True Value of the Confrontation Clause:
A Study of Child Sex Abuse Trials, 82 GEO. LJ. 1605, 1606-1607 (1994) (suggesting that a child victim is more
free to lie and that since the child does not have to face the defendant, he or she need not think about the impact
of the lie on the defendant); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing that in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused will enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him... ); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S.
56, 63 (1980) (holding that the Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial,
with the right of cross-examination, and is intended to exclude some hearsay). See generally 3 B.E. WrMN,
CALIFORNIA EViDENcE, Introduction of Evidence at Trial, §§ 1636-1688 (3rd ed. 1986 and Supp. 1995)
(analyzing the party's right to confrontation in criminal cases and distinguishing the hearsay rule from the
Confrontation Clause).
24. SENATE FLOOR, ComrTra ANALYSIS OF AB 355, at 2 (June 22, 1995); see Wright, 497 U.S. at
819 (stating that the theory of the hearsay rule is that many possible sources of inaccuracy and
untrustworthiness can be brought to light and exposed by the cross examination process). But see id. at 820
(opposing and criticizing the use of cross-examination if the declarant's trustworthiness is so clear from the
surrounding circumstances that the test of cross examination would be of marginal utility). See generally LILLY,
supra note 8 (discussing the inherent risks that arise when there is no opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant of an out-of-court statement).
25. See Wright, 497 U.S. at 820-21 (declaring that the victim, who was three years old at the time of
the trial, was not capable of communicating her story to the jury, but that the nature of her statements, the
corroborating physical evidence of the sexual abuse, and the lack of motive to make up a story of this nature
enabled the court to determine that the statement was not the type that one would expect a child to fabricate).
26. Beckett, supra note 23, at 1605; see id. (providing that the confrontation between the accused and
the victim often causes the child victim additional psychological trauma and permanent mental scarring); see
also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 836 (1989) (discussing a case where the victim was a six-year-old child
and had been subjected to alleged sexual abuse from her parent; the court, using expert testimony, determined
that children who were allegedly abused would suffer serious emotional distress if they were required to testify
in the courtroom, so much so that the victims would be unable to communicate); id. (upholding the use of one-
way closed circuit television to convey the testimony of an alleged child abuse victim to avoid mental ,scarring
to the alleged victim from facing his or her assailant).
27. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 853.
28. 497 U.S. 836 (1989).
29. Id. at 852-853; see id. (holding that one such important public policy is the protection of children
who have been sexually abused). See generally 3 B.E. Wra, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, Introduction of
Evidence at Trial, § 1687B(3)(b)(1) (9th ed. Supp. 1995) (noting that decisions upholding exceptions to the
hearsay rule have shown that the right to face-to-face confrontation is not absolute).
Pacific Law Journal/Vol 27
Evidence
In general, dispensing with the defendant's right to confront his or her
accuser may be warranted if the necessities of a case so prescribe. 0 With the
enactment of Chapter 87, the Legislature is promoting the policy of protecting
child sexual abuse victims from further abuses that arise out of the testimonial
process."
Tad A. Devlin
30. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64; see United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430,439 (1985) (upholding the
admission of testimony by a physician recounting the statements made by a child abuse victim identifying the
defendant); id. at 437 (noting that the exact nature and extent of psychological problems which ensue from
child abuse often depend on the identity of the abuser); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895)
(stating that a general rule, such as the Confrontation Clause, must occasionally give way to considerations of
public policy and the necessities of the case); id. (declaring that the accused should not receive constitutional
protection of the Confrontation Clause which would enable him to go unpunished merely because the testifying
witness died); id. (asserting that the rights of the public must not be wholly sacrificed to provide an incidental
benefit to the accused). But see Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1022 (1988) (holding that the defendant's right
to face-to-face confrontation was violated by the use of a screen to protect the witnesses' identity in the court
room; in the case, the defendant was charged with sexually assaulting two 13-year-old girls who were camping
out in their backyard when he allegedly entered their tent while the victims were sleeping).
31. ASSEMBLYCOMMFrrEEON PUBUC SAFETY, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OFAB 355, at 3 (Apr. 25, 1995);
see Coy, 487 U.S. at 1025 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the protection of child witnesses is a policy
that will permit the use of trial procedures other than face-to-face confrontation).
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